In a unionized oligopoly, such as tlle American automobile industry, should tlle union (such as tlle United Auto Workers) negotiate new contracts by bargaining witll tile firms simultaneously, or should it "strategically sequence" its bargaining partners? TItis paper analyzes two models of noncooperative bargaining and product market oligopoly. In tlle first. bargaining is over wages and employment, in tlle second, it is over wages alone: employment and output are deternrined by the firms in a post negotiation product market game. One effect of sequencing bargaining partners is present in bOtll scenarios : it allows preexisting contracts at tlle firms not being currently bargained witil to act as "status quo points" tllat influence tlle bargaining outcome of tile negotiations currently on. TIle better are the preexisting contracts from tlle union's point of view, tile more attractive is tlle option of sequencing. In tile second modeL tllere is another channel, operating via tlle post negotiation product market game tllat tends to make sequencing preferable. By negotiating a relatively high wage Witll tlle first firm, tlle union can raise tlle profitability of the second firm in the product market game; consequently, it can get a higher wage there as well, as its share in the incremental revenue tllat accrues. Moreover, tlle first firm is less reluctant to concede a higher wage (than under simultaneity) since it knows that tlle negative impact of tllat on its profits will be partly alleviated as tile second firm will also make a larger concession.
INTRODUCTION
Should the United Auto Workers (UAW) bargain over wage contracts simultaneously with GM, Ford and Chtys)er, or should it "strategically sequence" its bargaining partners? Should a firm with multiple input suppliers negotiate cost reductions with them simultaneously or should it bar~ gain with them one at a time? Should the U.S. target and negotiate with trade offenders simultane ously or sequentially? These settings have in common an agent who must bargain over several pies with several players. A natural question to ask then is whether bargaining with these players one at a time affords any advantage over bargaining with them simultaneously.
The instances provided above suggest that this is a problem faced by a variety of economic agents; yet, the literature that investigates this issue is sparse. It gets a brief mention in Dixit and Nalebuff(1991) . A discussion is available in Sebenius (1991) . But the only analytical model that 1 am aware of (other than this paper) that attempts to study the problem is in Chatterjee and Kim (1998, mimeo) . In their paper, Chatterjee and Kim model the agent who must bargain with several players over several pies as having private information about the value to him(or her) of the differ ent pies. Under some circumstances, sequencing his bargaining partners strategically allows the agent to reveal his private information via the agreement reached with the first partner. This influ ences the pie division with the second partner. If this influence is to the benefit of the agent, then he will, (under certain conditions), choose to indeed sequence his bargaining partners rather than bargain with them simultaneously. The present paper is quite different in scope and focus.
In what follows, the object of consideration is an oligopoly with a unionized (industrywide) workforce, such as the UAW and the Big Three. (For reasons of simplicity, the actual models deal with duopoJies. Davidson (1988) and Jun (1989) provide such models in the context of issues dif ferent from that in this paper. However, the modeling in the former paper is a crucial input in the second model of the present article). No player has any private information. Settings with private information may tum out to be very useful in understanding the importance or otherwise of strate gic sequencing; however, I feel that oligopolistic settings even under complete information have features which may explain slIch sequencing. I have attempted to isolate these features, leaving the study of the role of information under oligopoly to the future.
There are two models. In the first, the industry~wide union negotiates a separate wage and employment contract with each firm; in the second, it negotiates separate wage contracts, with firms choosing their employment levels after the wage agreements are reached. Precise formula tions of the two models are in the ensuing sections; here, I discuss a few key features of these mod els and preview the results.
Negotiations between the union and the firms in both models use noncooperative bargaining theory, specifically, variants of Rubinstein's (1982) model of noncooperative bargaining. In doing so, the process of negotiation is modeled in a precise manner; moreover, noncooperative bargaining meshes well with the noncooperative product market game that the firms are assumed to be play ing. In the first model, the players bargain over both wages and employment. For a bilateral mo nopoly, this is efficient (Leontief (1946». It turns out that efficiency continues to hold in the oli gopolistic setting of the present paper; (I therefore also call this model the efficient bargaining model). This is not the only natural formulation, because the law may permit firms to choose em· . ployment levels independently of the union; employment may not be on the negotiating table.
The "right to manage" law in the US., for instance, gives firms this power. The second model in this paper therefore assumes that the union and the firms bargain over wages only; (I call this the "right to manage" model); once wage agreements are reached, firms choose employment levels.
Specifically, post wage agreement, firms playas in a Coumot duopoly (we could also work in a differentiated product, price setting environment, but the algebra is much more messy and the thrust of the arguments for and against strategic sequencing stays the same). This model allows for much richer interaction between bargaining and product market behavior than does the first one; for instance, consider two alternative wage agreements (high wage, and low wage) between the union and firm 1 : the agreement on the higher wage implies higher costs for firm 1. If the two firms' products are strategic substitutes, this implies a lower Nash equilibrium output for firm 1, and higher output and profits for firm 2.1n this model, the wage bill that the union gets from firm 2 is higher, as a result. In contrast, the first model has, in equilibrium, a unique employment level (the efficient one) that is agreed upon with each firm, irrespective of the agreed-upon wage. In this paper, the newly negotiated contracts replace existing contracts; one key factor that determines whether the union prefers strategic sequencing to two simultaneous negotiations is the utility that it derives from the two old contracts (1 assume that the union's utility is separable across the two wage contracts negotiated; for simplicity I assume that it is equal to the two wage bills that it gets as a result of the contract agreements), relative to the utility it gets from the new contracts resulting from simultaneous negotiations, in equilibrium. In both models, in the simultaneous bar gaining case, there is a unique subgame'perfect equilibrium outcome in which the opening offers made by the union are immediately accepted by the firms. If, instead, one firm (say firm i) were to reject this equilibrium offer, while firm j accepts, then bargaining would continue between the union and firm i, while firm j becomes a (temporary) monopoly producer. Thus the union's wage bill from firm j becomes a "status quo" point that influences the contract agreement with firm i.
The higher is this wage bill, the better the contract with firm i as well. Suppose instead that the union sequenced the firms, opening negotiations first with firm i, while continuing production at firm j under the terms of the preexisting contract there. The wage bill that the union gets at tirm j under this contract then functions as the status quo point; it turns out in the efficient bargaining model that if this wage bill is larger (respectively, smaller) than the wage bill that the union gets from firm j in the simultaneous bargaining equilibrium, the union prefers sequencing (firm i, then firm j) to simultaneous bargaining (and vice versa).
The situation is much more complicated in the right to manage case, because the firms are allowed the freedom to set their output (and hence employment) levels, post wage agreements.
Thus consider strategic sequencing. If the union negotiates a relatively high wage with firm i, this makes the firm a relatively weak product market competitor, raising the potential profitability of firm j, and thereby the wage bill that the union can get out of firm j as shared rents via the bargain ing process. Moreover, firm i is less reluctant to concede a higher wage (than under simultaneity) since it knows that part of the negative effect of this on its profits will be alleviated as firm j will also concede a higher wage as a result. This second channel through which sequencing can become better for the union compared to simultaneous negotiations operates because the firms can adjust output and employment. 3 If bl 'Ihe rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I introduce the efficient bar gaining model, and its workings under the two bargaining protocols ~ simultaneous negotiations, counteroffe and sequencing, Section 3 presents an analysis of the model under these two protocols, and corn~ comes a tel pares the outcomes from the point of view of the union. Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to the" right stein. If th to manage" m.odel -the presentation and analysis attempts at corresponding closely to the pattern of wage-empl sections 2 and 3. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix. usual, WI making a counteroffer, and so forth, in the manner of Rubinstein's (1982) alternating offers game.
Each period that bargaining continues between firm i and the union, firm j produces qj (L j ) , sells tween Sl,; payoffs j it at price P(qj(L j », and makes a profit of [P(qj(Lj»qj(Lj) and Com~ comes a temporary monopoly, and bargaining between the union and firm i proceeds a la Rubin~ he n right stein. If the union rejects both counteroffers, then at time 2 it again makes simultaneous otfers of pattern of wage~empJoyment pairs to the two firms, and so on. Thus this subgame is isomorphic to the game at the start of period 0 (given our assumption that all players discount the future using (the same) discount factor),
. Payoffv : While bargaining is on with a firm, it makes no profits. In a period in which firm j is the only producer, its profit tr j ::;;; P(qj (Ll »qj (L / ) w/~j ;ifboth firms are producing, its profit
The union's payoff: If agre.ement with firm i is reached in period 7; and that with firm j in period Note, first, that the wage bilI is taken to be the union's payoff for simplicity. A payotT that is a general, concave function of the two wages and employment levels yields the same qualitative :s wage results (in fact, in the "right to manage" formulation, it is also somewhat easier to work with). accepts Second, in subgame perfect equilibrium, agreement on both contracts is simultaneous, so that the 1e union firms' discounted profits, and the union's discounted wage bilI, simply rescale their per-period ting and profits and wage bill. Henceforth we will talk in terms of these per period payoffs. Finally, as is 's game. usual, we will be interested in the limit of the subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs as the time be i)' sells tween successive offers tends to zero (15 ~1) . It can be shown that in this case, the limit of the ment is payoffs in the above game is the same as that of the finite horizon version of the game, so the con clusions of our analysis here holds for that game as well.
Bargaining Protocol -Sequencing: The union selects a firm, say firm i, to which it makes an of : we are fer (w" Lj)' Firm i may accept, or reject and make a counteroffer, and so on, along the lines of place-at Rubinstein (1982) . While negotiations are on, no production takes place at firm i ; meanwhile, while a production at firm j continues on the terms of the preexisting contract, (w~,L~), every period.
Once agreement with firm i is reached, the union makes its opening offer, (wJ ,L,) , to firm j.
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Oifers arc exchanged a la llubinstejn~ and no production takes place at firm j while negotiations are on ; firm i, meanwhile; produces every period on the terms of its newly negotiated contract.
ANALYSIS OF TIlE EFFICIENT BARGAINGING MODEL

Resultsfor tlte Simultaneous Offers Protocol
is the employment level of firm j that maximizes its total revenue -it is the "efficient': level of em Applying lemma 1 now to firm i, if the two tirms and the union are still bargaining at timet, and !inn i settles as above, then since firm j will settle simultaneously on the contract specified in lemma 1, it follows that in subgame perfect equilibrium firm i settles on (w; ,Pi (P j (Li »). lienee we have the following corollary.
Corollary:
In a SPE, the 2firms must settle with the union in the same period, at (w; ,L; ),j 1,2.
We now use this result to propose a subgame perfect equilibrium in which there is immediate vel of em· agreement on the union's opening offers, (w lr , L~), (w2r' L;). In this equilibrium, the union always nuein L ) offers these wage -employment pairs in subgames in which it makes offers to both firms. The he appenGrms always offer (w;" L;), (w;" L;) in subgames in which the firms make simultaneous offers.
ive statics To see that this is part of a SPE, suppose the union offers (wI>L~ ),(W2' L;), (by lemma 1, we re :uarantees strict ourselves to these employment levels), and suppose that if firms reject, then agreement is r demand reached next period on their proposals
Consider the following problem for the union.
Problem U:
). That
le firms, Constraints (1) and (2) 
The limits of these payoffs, as the time between offers tends to plus the 1 1 As there is no natural length for a time period, and since the players have an incentive to settle as fer give soon as possible, the literature often focuses on the payoffs in this limit; so do we. Next we note we calc that the equilibrium above is unique. accepH Theorem 2: The SPE described above is the unique SPE.
Proof: Appendix. First, note that in SPE, the employment levels wi.11 be (1.,;, Z:;) . Suppose the union and firm 1 bargain first and settle On (w" 1., ) . Given this, it follows from the proof of lemma 1 that firm :2 and the union will settle immediately on some (w 2' L 2 ) with L2 :::: /32 (1.1 ). In SPE, therefore, by backward recursion, the union and firm 1 will settle on
It is now easy to construct the SPE under sequencing.
Suppose the union bargains first with firm i , then with firm j. Once agreement is reached with firm i , the union will offer, in the next period, (wjr' L:) to firm j, which will accept. So this agreement will affect the payoffs of firm i and the union in their bilateral bargaining game. Thus reject that game will have a unique SPE, whose outcome is calculated from the following equations (it
Isures
helps to write the payoffs as discounted streams):
1S are (9) Equation (8) 
3.3, Intelj
Is thus what the union gets in SPE. wage bill from a preexisting contract with any firm is higher than the one that will result from the simultaneous offers protocol, the union will choose to sequence; of course, then, the union may c have the highest payoff by choosing to stick with the existing contracts. We are assuming that this conclude is not an option. This issue, and others that arise in this light (such as whether it is better for the be contn union not to strike but to holdout (Cramton and Tracy (1992», the structure of equilibria when the entirely i union can switch every period between striking and not striking (Haller and Holden (1989) , Fer nandez and Glazer (1990»), are not investigated here, since the focus is on sequencing. Second, 4. "lUG once new agreements are negotiated, if there's no change in demand or technology in the future, then the union has no incentive to negotiate new contracts in the future -both the simultaneous of fers protocol and the sequencing protocol leave its payoff unchanged. Third, if demand expands or technology improves in the future, so that there is incentive for the union to recontract, the new Once a \ contracts (under simultaneous offers) will likely have higher wage bills than the existing contracts profits.
-in that case, simultaneous offers will be preferred to sequencing. 'espect to the sequencing case is that, with respect to the bargaining problem between the union and firm i (the "first" firm), the union's disagreement point is w~L~, the wage bill from the preexisting conlion may Clearly, if the disagreement point wJ L~ > w jrL:, the union is better off sequencing. One that this !r for the concludes that sequencing allows the union to "switch" its disagreement point from the wage bill to Nhen the be contracted with firm j, to its preexisting wage bill. Whether or not sequencing is better derives 9), Fer~ entirely from which disagreement point is better for the union.
Second, e future,
"RIGHT TO MANAGE" MODEL eous of )ands or
The basic difference here is that employment is not on the bargaining table; only wage is.
the new Once a wage is agreed upon, the firm has a "right to manage" -to choose employment to maximize ontracts profits. This assumption is closer to the condition prevailing, say, in the case of the UAWand the try conAmerican automobile companies. We retain the notation of section 2. The implication of the "right to manage" assumption can be exposited by describing the 2 bargaining protocols under it. 1982) ; if the unionrejects both offers, then at time 2 it makes simultaneous offers, and so forth.
Simultaneous Offers Protocol
limit as tt
Sequencing Protocol: Again, this is exactly as in section 2 ; if the union bargains first with firm i , by max". firm j produces meanwhile as a monopoly, at the preexisting wage w~, and employment level L~, refer to tl which could now connote the monopoly profit maximizing level of employment at that wage. agreemer Once both agreements are reached, the firms playas Coumot competitors.
wage bill
Note that the profit of firm i when both firms are producing is given by: Basically, given w" we have a standard alternating offers bargaining game between the union and tein firm j. Applying the well known result of Binmore (1987) , the Rubinstein wage for firm j, in the limit as the time between offers tends to zero, is the argmax of the Nash Bargaining solution given 1 
i , by maxw)w;L;C(Wi,Wj)+wjLJc(Wj,lllj)-wjL,m(Wi)]7Tjc(WpWj)'
We call this "Problem)", to refer to the bargaining problem between the union and firm j. Here, the union's payoff from the 1ge.
agreement is the sum of the first two terms in the square brackets; its "disagreement point" is the wage bill Wi Lim (Wi) that accrues to it in the event that it can't settle on an agreement with firm j. Problem j is a function of WI' so we write W j r} (w; ). To ensure that a unique solution exists, we impose conditions under which the objective in Problem j is strictly concave and single-peaked (see for appendix for details). Ifwe had directly specified the union's payoff as a strictly concave function of wages and employment levels, the conditions would have been less restrictive; however, for the comparability with the efficient bargaining model, we work here, too, with the wage bill as the un ion's payoff. It is well known in this setting (Davidson (1988» that the set of attainable pairs of
wage bill and profit is convex, and that at the Nash Bargaining solution, -----=---'---Z 0 .
The reason is that as C"W,_,'-___,~;c~)_ < 0, if the wage bill were decreasing in w)' then we are not at Note also that the agreement is on the same pair of wages irrespective of who (union or the firms) We are n is making the offers ~ as the time between offers tends to zero, the "first mover advantage" van librium { ishes.
better (~ The first Lemma 2 can be used to describe the following SPE of the game in which the time between offers is arbitrarily small. The union always offers (w~, w;), in subgames in which it makes offers I wdL iC . , to both firms, Firm i, i = 1,2, accepts all Wi S w; ,and rejects higher wage offers. In subgames in which both firms make offers, they always offer w;, w;. The union accepts all (WI' w 2 ) with w,::::: (l'2c »qi (L ic (w; ,w;» w; L ic (w; ,w;) 
Here, wJ L~ is the union's wage bill accruing from firm j, from the preexisting contract. If em ase.> ployment was not negotiable in that, then it equals the monopoly level of employment.
~ms)
We are now in a position to compare the union's SPE payoffs from the two protocols. At the equi van librium outcome (w;, rj (wn) above, the wage bill is increasing in Wi' Therefore, sequencing is better ( worse) for the union, compared to simultaneity, if and only if w; > ( <)w; .
leen
The first order condition for Problem S is
The solution is w;. On the other hand, the first order condition for the Nash Bargaining problem ill J between firm i and the union, under the simultaneous offers protocol, at the solution (w; ,w; (12) ispositive (resp. negative).
The expressions inside the first two square brackets in expression (12) The expr S is greater than w; ,that is, it pays the union to sequence.
As with the efficient bargaining model, if the preexisting wage bill wJL~ is higher than the The ob} one that would result from the SPE of the simultaneous offers protocol bargaining game, we have the case where sequencing firm j after firm i gives the union a higher disagreement point than un der the simultaneous offers game. Thus the union is better off sequencing. However, even if
The dis:
wJL~ <w;L,m(w;), expression (12) could well be positive, implying that sequencing remains the union's preferred choice. The reason is that increasing w; beyond Wi· raises firm i's costs, and in evaluate gain wit Coumot equilibrium, raises firm j's profits. As employment is adjusted by the firms, firm j raises uct marl employment and wages to share its incremental rent with the union (in tum, this dilutes the nega tive impact of the increase in w; on firm i' s profits). Hence, because employment is adjustable 16 I '
, " ". " under right~tcHnal1age law. there is a second channel through which sequencing can become pre ferred by the union.
In the efficient bargaining model, since sequencing is preferred if and only if a preexisting wage bill exceeds the equilibrium wage bill under simultaneity, sequencing could coincide with the tion case where the union is better off remaining with both preexisting contracts rather than negotiate 1) is new ones. In the right to manage model, this rigid relationship is broken due to the ext,ra channel at work. Thus, the case for explaining sequencing by appealing to our complete information setting is much stronger in a set up where a right to manage type of law or environment exists.
Finally, note that short of computation, it is not clear from expression (12) which way to se~ quence the two firms in order to maximize the union's payoff. Even in symmetric (in terms of technology) cases, where only the level of the preexisting wage bills are different, there is a trade off between a higher:value to the product ofJast two terms (via a higher wJL~) and a lower value 'es to the product of the third and fourth terms of expression (12) In evaluating the efficacy of sequencing vis-a.-vis simultaneity from the point of view of the union in an oligopoly, we have isolated two effects. In choosing to sequence, the union takes re course to the preexisting wage bill at the firm with whom it will negotiate only later, as the status 3.1.2. P quo point; whereas under simultaneity, the status quo point is, in effect, the equilibrium wage bill ,. Step 2 ence product market competition. A higher wage with the first firm weakens the firm's post bar gaining competitive position in the product market game, and therefore allows a settlement with the second firm at a higher wage as well. This clearly benefits the union. The first firm, too, is more where amenable to conceding a higher wage (than under simultaneity) since it knows that as a result, the second firm will have to follow suit, thereby alleviating somewhat the negative impact on its prof 1+ ( its. As a result, a union operating under a right to manage environment is much more likely to se quence than one which negotiates both wages and employment.
3.1.2.
APPENDIX
Step 1 libriur 3.1.1. Uniqueness of ~(L;) ,. existence of (~, L;) For the first we need total revenue to be strictly concave in L j . Twice differentiating the total revenue function and setting < 0, gives us the condition 18 ghcr.
"
' 2 "
p" :ver, be at least as large as its continuation value from rejecting the offer. Firm j gets 
ProofofTheorem 2
We exploit the fact that subgame perfect equilibria result in simultaneous agreements.
Step 1 : (w 1r ,w 2r ) is the highest pair of wages that the firms can simultaneously agree to, in equi librium.
Proof: Suppose the union offers (wp~),(w2,L;). Given firm i accepts (wpL;), firm j will accept he (wj,L:) iff wi S w ir . Else, it will reject, and get its counteroffer (w~r>L:) accepted next period, and be better off.
19
Step 2: (w;,,l~),(w~r>.z.;) is the only pair of offers that the firms make that is accepted simultane~ Step 3: In SPE, (w!r,L;),(w 2 "L;) is the only pair of proposals that the union will otTer and the firms will simultaneously agree to.
Proof: Given the unique pair of proposals that the firms will otTer (step 2), and given step 1, this is the best that the union can do.
5. 1.1. Existence of ".(w; ) 
the IS is and rearranging, we get
The first two terms of A are positive (the expression inside the square brackets of the second prod uct is positive at the solution -it is the derivative of the wage bill). The third is usually negative .ere (including in the linear case, since the cross partial is negative), and the fourth is usually positive, so that A is likely to be positive. Of the three terms in B, only the third is positive (if profit is con :lge vex in own wage, as in the linear demand case), so that B is likely negative. To ensure existence, But then~
From ste
The method is similar to the proof of uniqueness in Theorem 2. It should be borne in mind that in SPE, there is simultaneous agreement on both wage offers, both when the union makes offers, and when the firms make them.
which it
Step 1: {(w j ,W 2 ):W 1 S; 1j(W 2 ),W 2 S; '2(W\)} is the set of wage offers of the union for which simulta neous agreement by the firms can be a Nash Equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose the union offers a pair (WI' w 2 ), Given that firm i accepts Wi' firm j will accept w, if: and only if, Wj s; ,/w;). Else, it will reject, and immediately settle at its counteroffer 'j(w,) .
Step 2 : (w;, w;) is the only pair of wage the firms can offer that the union will accept, in SPE.
Proof: For a pair (w;, w~), such that for some i=1,2, w; < r, (w~), simultaneous acceptance is not the best response for the union. Accepting w~, rejecting w;, and settling immediately on the counterofTer r,(w~) is better. Consider the remaining case of a pair (w;,w;)s.t.w; > r,(w~),i = 1,2, which the union accepts simultaneously. Clearly, simultaneous acceptance is better than accepting one and rejecting the other. Since the wage ofTers of the firms must be best responses to each other, accepting both must give the union exactly its continuation value, V, from rejecting both of fers.
Note that V > w~~c(w;, w;) +w;4cCw~, w;) . For if V =( ), then, (w;, w;) 
